The Newhall Incident, which took place on April 5, 1970, in Newhall, California, was a tragic event that resulted in the deaths of four California Highway Patrol officers. This catastrophic incident unfolded during a routine traffic stop, spiraling into a violent confrontation that forever changed the landscape of modern policing.
The Newhall Incident unfolded against the backdrop of a rapidly changing social and political climate in the United States during the late 1960s and early 1970s. Against this tumultuous backdrop, law enforcement officers grappled with an increasingly volatile landscape, marked by heightened tensions and the proliferation of criminal activity.
Table of Contents
- Context of the Newhall Incident
- Analysis of Policing Strategies in the Newhall Incident
- Lessons Learned from the Newhall Incident
- Final Thoughts
Context of the Newhall Incident
The sequence of events leading up to the Newhall Incident serves as a stark reminder of the unpredictable and often perilous nature of police work. From a seemingly routine traffic stop to an unforeseen escalation, the chain of events leading to the tragic outcome underscores the importance of preparedness and situational awareness in law enforcement operations.
April 5-6, 1970
The Newhall incident, often known as the Newhall massacre, involved two highly armed criminals and four California Highway Patrol (CHP) officers engaging in gunfire on April 5–6, 1970, in Valencia, California. It was the worst day in California law enforcement history, with the four CHP officers slain in less than five minutes and the fifth pistol-whipped.
In connection with an incident that had been reported to the CHP minutes earlier, CHP officers Walt Frago and Roger Gore pulled Bobby Davis and Jack Twinning over at approximately 11:54 p.m. on April 5. After assisting the officers at first, Twinning and Davis opened fire, killing the two of them. Twinning and Davis were involved in a shootout with officers George Alleyn and James Pence shortly after they arrived on the scene. An officer’s firearm was fired by a bystander in an attempt to assist, but the three were outnumbered. Alleyn and Pence were both fatally injured, and the witness took refuge in a ditch after running out of ammunition. When a third CHP patrol car pulled up, the offenders and the cops engaged in a brief gunfight before the offenders fled.
After stealing a car, Davis tried to escape the area, but the police caught him and took him into custody. Twinning, in the meantime, broke into a house and kidnapped the resident. Deputies from the Los Angeles County Sheriff’s Department encircled it, and Twinning freed the hostage. As the deputies were entering the house around nine in the morning, he took his own life. Davis was found guilty of the killings and given the death penalty. In 1972, his sentence was reduced to life in prison without the possibility of release; in 2009, he committed suicide while incarcerated at Kern Valley State Prison.
Impact on Law Enforcement Practices
The Newhall Incident reverberated throughout the law enforcement community, prompting a profound reassessment of existing practices and protocols. Its impact resonated far beyond the immediate aftermath, sparking critical conversations about officer safety, tactical decision-making, and the need for enhanced communication protocols within law enforcement agencies.
Analysis of Policing Strategies in the Newhall Incident
Following the gunfight, the events surrounding the incident were closely examined. The CHP and other law enforcement agencies reevaluated their training programmes and strategies.
All four of the CHP officers that were killed had just been working for two years. Pence and Alleyn were both twenty-four, Gore and Frago twenty-three. At that time, police officers were not commonly issued bulletproof vests, hence none of them had one on. It was discovered that three of the patrolmen had died from injuries that may have been avoided with a regular ballistic vest.
Gore and Frago made a crucial error that is believed to have been caused by their inexperience: they approached and searched the suspects as soon as they were pulled over. If they had waited for Pence and Alleyn to show there, in around a minute, Twinning and Davis might have given up or been overpowered by better weaponry in a 4-on-2 situation.
The three cops who discharged their weapons were using.357 Magnum rounds, despite having only been trained and certified to use the less recoiling.38 Special ammunition. The CHP ensured that all of its officers were trained with the same ammunition they would use on duty shortly after the firefight by standardising their ammo on.38 calibre rounds. Another issue that was brought up during the shootout was their unfamiliarity with their service shotguns. Alleyn had expelled a live shell, and Frago had approached the car with his shotgun held diagonally in front of him.
The Newhall episode demonstrated how challenging it is to reload revolvers while under fire without a speedloader. Not too long later, the CHP was the first significant state police (or comparable) agency to authorise and distribute speedloaders. A backup firearm might have been helpful for Pence in case his primary pistol ran out of ammunition.
Following the Newhall shooting, the CHP changed their training to forbid “pocketing brass”—the act of picking up empty cartridge cases before reloading with new rounds—on the range, even though this was not based on the conduct of any of the officers engaged in the incident. Officer Pence’s clothing was not discovered to contain any brass casings, according to many witnesses, including the officers who came to help the four officers. Six brass cases were discovered on the ground near to the driver’s door of Pence and Alleyn’s cruiser, according to CHP Sergeant Harry Ingold, one of the first responders. This suggests that Pence had previously discarded his used brass casings on the ground before reloading his pistol before he was slain.
Lessons Learned from the Newhall Incident
Training acronym
As a result of the Newhall shooting, the CHP created the following training acronym (N-E-W-H-A-L-L):
N – Never approach a dangerous situation until you are adequately prepared and supported.
E – Evaluate the offense, determine if you might be dealing with something more dangerous than it looks.
W – Wait for backup.
H – Have a plan (in other words, don’t just wade into a situation without planning every move).
A – Always maintain the advantage over the opponent.
L – Look for the unusual.
L – Leave the scene when in doubt.
The significance of having good situational awareness
Officers Gore and Frago, who were very young and inexperienced, ignored several crucial behavioural and situational indications when they approached the suspects’ vehicle after it had stopped in the parking lot. They didn’t recognize that the driver had stopped in an unusual spot, leaving the officers trapped in the middle of a narrow driveway.
Although the original caller advised there was a lone driver in the vehicle, the officers were dealing with two subjects who were both uncooperative. Officers had to repeat commands several times before they even complied with the smallest demand.
Good tactics are everything
The easiest tactic to deploy (when time allows) is to wait for backup. Even though Officers Pence and Alleyn were only a minute away, Officers Gore and Frago took the suspects out of the car without waiting for them for reasons that are still unclear. The officers lost the cover, superior defensive posture, and numerical advantage that could have turned the tide in their favour by moving too quickly. When engaging with suspects, you may not always be able to decide the time of the interaction, but when you are in charge, take your time.
Basic contact and cover procedures were broken, which was a second grave error at Newhall. Officer Frago abandoned his role as the cover officer and went forward to remove the noncompliant passenger shortly after Officer Gore reached the car to search the driver. The contact and cover relationship broke down when he did this, making both cops more open to assault.
The importance of good training
The Newhall officers were, in many respects, victims of their training. The CHP had a thorough and competent training programme by the standards of the time period. The CHP had a live-in, 16-week academy that was regarded as one of the best in the country, and its officers were held in high regard for their level of training during a time when many new officers reported for duty without receiving official academy-style training.
Although the CHP had a good programme in place at the time, the officers were not adequately prepared for the kinds of situations they would likely encounter in the field by their training. Important themes related to officer safety were not given adequate attention in the unbalanced syllabus. The cadets were not given enough time to fully internalise the essential skills and techniques they learned and practised. Certain types of training, such as the training on firearms, were certain to be unresilient to the impacts of stress because they lacked context and realism.
Final Thoughts
The relevance of learning from historical incidents in policing cannot be understated. As we look back on the Newhall Incident and its enduring impact, we are reminded of the crucial role that historical reflection plays in shaping contemporary policing practices. By drawing upon the lessons of the past, the law enforcement community can proactively anticipate and mitigate potential challenges, fostering a safer and more secure environment for both officers and the communities they serve.
In conclusion, the Newhall Incident serves as a poignant testament to the resilience and commitment of the law enforcement community. By embracing the lessons learned from this pivotal event, we can collectively strive towards a future characterized by enhanced safety, effective policing strategies, and strengthened community relations.
Ben
My dad was a CHP in the 70s, and he often recalls this. Thanks for sharing!